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STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,
• Petitioner,
-and-
COPIAGUE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Employer,
-and-
\
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Intervenor.
CASE NO. C-6227
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected,
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their
Certification - C-6227 -2
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.
Included: Full-time and part-time cafeteria workers including cook managers,
assistant cooks, food service workers, kitchen workers, hourly paid 
security aides and school security guards, part-time receptionist 
aides, hallway aides, suspension room aides, cafeteria aides and 
driver messenger.
Excluded: All other employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: April 3, 2014
Albany, New York
s: Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
MEDINA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION,
-and-
VILLAGE OF MEDINA,
Petitioner,
Employer,
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Intervenor.
CASE NO. C-6230
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected,
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Medina Police Benevolent Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.
Included: full-time police officers, part-time police officers and sergeants
employed by the Village of Medina.
Excluded: chief of police, assistant chief of police and lieutenant.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the Medina Police Benevolent Association. The duty to
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession,
DATED: April 3, 2014
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6235
SCHENECTADY CITY SCHOOL DISTRIT,
Employer.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected,
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances.
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Included: All employees of the Schenectady City School District in the ATLAS
program titles of ATLAS Tutor -  part-time and ATLAS Tutor -  per 
diem.
Excluded: All other employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000,
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: April 3, 2014
Albany, New York ' -
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6240
TOWN OF HAVERSTRAW,
Employer.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected,
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances.
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Included: FT/PT Dispatchers.
Excluded: All other employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000,
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: April 3, 2014
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
DONNA SCARPINATI DE OLIVEIRA,
Charging Party,
-and-
CAIRO-DURHAM TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
Respondent,
-and-
CAIRO-DURHAM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Employer.
CASE NO. U-30028
MARTIN, SHUDT, WALLACE, DiLORENZO & JOHNSON (CARLO A. C. DE 
OLIVEIRA of counsel), for Charging Party
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT T. REILLY and 
LAURA R. HALLAR of counsel), for Respondent
GIRVIN & FERLAZZO (JEFFREY D. HONEYWELL and RYAN MULLAHY of 
counsel), for Employer
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Donna Scarpinati de Oliveira to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) that dismissed an improper practice 
charge that de Oliveira filed against her union, Cairo-Durham Teachers Association 
(“Association”).1 The ALJ held that de Oliveira did not prove that the Association 
violated §§ 209-a.2 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees’ fair Employment Act (“Act”) by 
failing to adequately investigate and grieve her claim that her employer, Cairo-Durham
1 46 PERB 4579 (2013).
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Central School District (“District”), improperly laid her off based on an incorrect 
calculation of her relative seniority and in retaliation for her use of Family and Medical 
Leave Act benefits. The District was named as a “statutory party” pursuant to § 209-a.3 
of the Act.
EXCEPTIONS
De Oliveira argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing her charge. She contends, 
inter alia, that the record establishes that the Association unlawfully agreed with the 
District to exclude two elementary school teachers with less seniority than she from the 
list of teachers slated to be laid off. She further argues that the Association unlawfully 
failed to adequately investigate and process a grievance concerning her claim that the 
District improperly calculated her seniority by excluding time during which she was 
absent from work pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act. Finally, she argues 
that the Association breached its duty of fair representation by telling her that it would 
obtain the advice of an attorney, when it obtained the advice of a non-attorney labor 
relations specialist employed by the New York State United Teachers (“NYSUT”).
The Association and the District filed responses in support of the ALJ’s decision.
FACTS '
As reflected in the August 3, 2007 minutes of the District’s Board of Education, 
de Oliveira was hired by the District, for a three-year probationary position as an 
elementary school teacher, effective September 1, 2007 through August 30, 2010. At 
that time de Oliveira held provisional certification in Pre-Kindergarten, Kindergarten and 
grades 1-6.
At the same meeting, the District hired Peter Goodwin to a similar three year 
probationary position as a 6th grade math teacher, also effective September 1, 2007
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through August 30, 2010. At that time, Goodwin held initial certification as a math 
teacher for grades 5-9.
As reflected in the Board of Education’s September 20, 2007 minutes, the District 
hired Erin Murphy for a three year probationary position as a 6th grade English teacher, 
effective October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2010. At that time, Murphy held initial 
certification as an English teacher for grades 5-12.
Although each position was probationary, each was a “tenure track” position.
In July, 2009, de Oliveira gave birth to a daughter and, rather than returning to 
work at the beginning of the 2009 school year, took a leave of absence pursuant to the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). She returned to work on October 13, 2009, 
after 23 school days of FMLA leave.
On May 4, 2010, de Oliveira met with Scott Richards, the District’s elementary 
school principal, to discuss “budget updates.” Also in attendance was Sally Sharkey, 
the District’s Superintendent. Sharkey told de Oliveira that she was going to be laid off 
at the end of the school year for budgetary reasons. Sharkey explained that de 
Oliveira’s relative seniority was adversely affected by the 23 days of FMLA leave that 
she had used at the beginning of the year, during which time she did. not accrue 
seniority. Because she did not accrue seniority during her absence, her relative 
seniority dropped to a point where she was on the layoff list. To de Oliveira, Sharkey’s 
explanation sounded like she was being unlawfully laid off because she used FLMA 
leave -  not because of her relative seniority.
Soon after the meeting with Richards and Sharkey, de Oliveira contacted Justin 
Karker, the Association’s president, and requested that he forward her written concerns 
about her layoff to “our NYSUT representative,” whom she also referred to as “our
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Union counsel.” Indeed, de Oliveira testified that Karker told her that he would be 
speaking with a NYSUT “attorney."
De Oliveira’s written concerns, dated March 6, 2010, asked whether the District 
could use her FLMA leave “to justify [her] termination.” If not, she opined that she has 
“a very strong case.” Likewise, she inquired whether the District could factor her FMLA 
leave into calculating her seniority for purposes of the layoff. She thought it unfair that 
she was not accruing seniority while on FMLA. Here, again, she opined that she did not 
believe that the District could use her FMLA absence against her. She asked that her 
questions and concerns be forwarded to our “Union counsel” as soon as possible.
About one week later, de Oliveira met with Karker to discuss her March 6 letter. 
Karker told her that he would send her packet to the New York State United Teachers 
(NYSUT) to try to get some answers. Karker forwarded the letter to NYSUT Labor 
Relations Representative Peter Stelling, whom he considered his advisor in matters of 
this nature. Stelling is not an attorney.
During their conversation, Karker and de Oliveira also discussed, without 
resolution, the relative seniority of Goodwin and Murphy, who had potentially less 
seniority than de Oliveira, but who were not on the layoff list.
At its meeting of March 25, 2010, the Board of Education resolved to eliminate 
four positions in “the Elementary Education tenure area” [emphasis added], effective 
June 30, 2010. Consistent with what she had already been told, de Oliveira’s position 
was among the four that the District decided to abolish. Indeed, according to Karker, in 
fashioning a list of employees to be laid off, the District and the Association agreed'that 
Murphy and Goodwin should not be included because they were not in “the Elementary 
Education tenure area.” They reasoned that their teacher certifications were for upper
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grades -  not elementary level grades.
By letter dated March 31,2010, Sharkey formally notified de Oliveira that she 
would be laid off, effective June 30, 2010.
De Oliveira met with Karker again on or about April 20, 2010, after Karker
<!
received the results of NYSUT’s review of de Oliveira’s March 6 letter. During the 
course of the meeting, Karker told de Oliveira that the Association disagreed with her 
position about the impact of her FMLA leave on her seniority. In support, he showed 
her a portion of an American Federation of Teachers publication entitled “A Guide to the 
Family & Medical Leave Act,” which stated that seniority does not automatically accrue 
while on such leave. Fie also explained that Goodwin and Murphy were not on the 
layoff list because their certifications were not in the “elementary education tenure, 
area.”
By letter to Karker, dated May 3, 2010, de Oliveira, by her attorney, accused the 
Association of breaching its duty of fair representation by permitting the District to use 
her FMLA leave against her in calculating her seniority for purposes of the layoff. 
Similarly, the letter accused the Association of breaching its duty of fair representation 
by “choosing” to exclude a less senior teacher from the seniority list [Murphy] by 
agreement with Sharkey. Finally, the letter accused the Association, of allowing the 
District to engage in sex-based discrimination against another teacher who was laid off 
while on maternity leave.
Karker responded to de Oliveira’s attorney by letter dated May 6. Karker 
explained that the Association does not represent employees in sex discrimination 
matters before the Division of Human Rights. Similarly, he said that if de Oliveira 
believed that there had been a violation of the FMLA, she could file a complaint with the
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Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division or in District Court. Karker also explained 
that if de Oliveira believes that a contract violation had occurred, she should tell Karker 
the section of the agreement that could be grieved in order for the Association to pursue 
the matter. Finally, Karker described the steps he took to determine de Oliveira’s 
relative seniority.
On May 7, de Oliveira filed a grievance alleging various contract violations 
associated with her layoff. The grievance was denied at each stage of the contractual 
procedure, including step-3 -  the Board of Education -  on June 21. Meanwhile, de 
Oliveira commenced proceedings before the Division of Human Rights and the 
Commissioner of Education, each complaining of the District’s decision to include her 
on the layoff list.
By letter dated September 24, 2010, the District offered de Oliveira, the most 
senior person on the eligibility list of laid off teachers, reinstatement to an elementary 
school teaching position. She did not accept the offer.
Subsequently, by decision dated September 18, 2012, the Commissioner of 
Education held that the District erred in excluding Goodwin and Murphy from the 
seniority list, but that de Oliveira was still properly laid off. According to the 
Commissioner, she had 23 days less seniority than Goodwin and, at least three days 
less than Murphy because she was not entitled to accrue seniority while she was on 
FMLA leave.
DISCUSSION
The settled test to determine a breach of the duty of fair representation under the 
Act was articulated by the Appellate Division in Matter of Civil Service Employees Assn
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Local 1000 v New York State Public Employment Relations Board and Diaz.2 There,
the Court held [citations omitted]:
In order to establish a claim for breach of the duty of fair 
representation against a union, there must be a showing that 
the activity, or lack thereof, which formed the basis of the 
charges against the union was deliberately invidious, arbitrary 
or founded in bad faith. Accordingly, and in any event, we 
reject the standard applied by PERB that “irresponsible or 
grossly negligent” conduct may form the basis for a union's 
breach of the duty of fair representation as not within the 
meaning of improper employee organization practices set 
forth in Civil Service Law § 209-a. An honest mistake 
resulting from misunderstanding or lack of familiarity with 
matters of procedure does not rise to the level of the requisite 
arbitrary, discriminatory of bad-faith conduct required to 
establish an improper practice by the union.
Here, de Oliveira argues that the test to establish a breach of the Association’s
r
duty of fair representation is satisfied by evidence that it declined to adequately 
investigate and to process a grievance concerning her placement on the layoff list. She 
also argues that the test was satisfied by the Association’s agreement with the District 
that Goodwin and Murphy should be removed from the list of elementary school 
teachers slated for layoff.
We disagree.
The Association investigated her grievance by examining the District’s seniority 
list and by submitting de Oliveira’s specific “concerns” to NYSUT for review. Although
the NYSUT representative who examined her submission is not an attorney, he is the
/
Labor Relations Specialist assigned to the unit. In that regard, we note that there is no
requirement under the Taylor Law that such advice must come from attorneys.
However, it appears that Karker may have told de Oliveira that her concerns would be
2 132 AD 2d 430, 432, 20 PERB 7024, at 7039 (3d Dept 1987), aff'd on other grounds 
73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB H 7017 (1988).
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reviewed by a NYSUT attorney. While we agree with de Oliveira that such a 
representation could be misleading, on the facts of this case we see no material effect 
of the misstatement. Indeed, there is no evidence that Karker’s representation as to 
who would review her concerns was deliberately intended to mislead her regarding the 
merits of her dispute with the District.
Likewise, that the District excluded Goodwin and Murphy from the list of 
elementary school teachers to be laid off does not mean that the Association’s 
agreement with that position breached its duty of fair representation. While the decision 
of the Commissioner of Education shows that both were wrong in their assessment of 
the appropriate treatment of Goodwin and Murphy, the Association’s incorrect 
assessment is merely mistaken. There is, for example, no evidence that its assessment
was based on antipathy toward de Oliveira or favoritism toward Goodwin and Murphy as
/
might show discriminatory intent or bad faith. As the Appellate Division observed in 
CSEA vPERB, supra, “An honest mistake resulting from misunderstanding or lack of 
familiarity with matters of procedure does not rise to the level of the requisite arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad-faith conduct'required to establish an improper practice by the 
union.”
Finally, the Association’s refusal to file a grievance on de Oliveira’s behalf or to 
take the one she filed to arbitration does not establish a breach of the duty of fair 
representation. The Association’s determination was based upon its good faith 
understanding that she lacked a contractual basis to contest her placement on the list of 
employees to be laid off. Simply put, the Association reasonably believed that she had 
less relative seniority than the employees who were excluded from the list. In fact, the 
Association’s assessment proved to be true, as reflected in the decision of the
Case No. U-30028 -9 -
Commissioner of Education.
We have considered the balance of de Oliveira’s arguments and find them to be 
without merit. De Oliveira lacks standing to allege a breach of the Association’s duty of 
fair representation toward others, and the Association has no Taylor Law duty to pursue 
her complaints with the Division of Human Rights or the Department of Labor.
THEREFORE, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed and the charge is dismissed in 
it’s entirely.
DATED: April 3, 2014
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
HUDSON VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
NON-INSTRUCTIONAL EMPLOYEES UNION,
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-30395
- and - -
HUDSON VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE and 
COUNTY OF RENSSELAER,
Respondent.
HINMAN STRAUB P.C. (JOHN R. SACCOCIO, of counsel), for 
Charging Party
MARTIN, SHUDT, WALLACE, DiLORENZO & JOHNSON (CARLO C. DE 
OLIVEIRA and DAVID T. GARVEY of counsel), for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Hudson Valley Community 
College and the County of Rensselaer (together, “College”) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).1 The ALJ held that the College violated §§ 
209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (“Act”) when it
i
ceased to hire full-time employees represented by the Hudson Valley Community 
College Non-lnstructional Employees Union (“NIEU”) to perform “second jobs” for 
the College in retaliation for NIEU’s advocating that the employees be paid 
overtime for such work.
46 PERB If 4565 (2013).1
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EXCEPTIONS
The College argues that NIEU’s advocacy for overtime for unit members 
who work “second jobs” is not protected activity because NIEU’s position lacks 
merit. It further argues that the ALJ erred in finding that NIEU met its burden of 
proof to establish the requisite nexus between NIEU’s activities and its decision to 
cease offering “second jobs” to unit employees. Finally, the College argues that 
its decision to cease offering “second jobs” to NIEU’s members was motivated by 
legitimate business reasons -  not NIEU’s protected activities.
NIEU filed a response in support of the ALJ’s determination.
Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, we
conclude that the College violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, and we adopt
/
the ALJ’s recommended remedial order.
FACTS ;
The facts are accurately recited by the ALJ.
The parties’ collective bargaining agreement contains a provision 
addressing overtime (time and a half). Employees who are scheduled to work 
3IV i hours per week are to receive overtime for work performed in excess of 371/4 
hours. Employees who are scheduled to work 40 hours per week are to be paid 
overtime for work performed in excess of 40 hours. All other employees are to 
receive overtime for work performed in excess of 40 hours per week.
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In May 2004, the College and NIEU entered into an agreement regarding
compensation for “second jobs.” As confirmed in a March 26, 2004 letter from the
College’s attorney to NIEU’s attorney
Based upon information obtained during the 
negotiations for the recent NIEU collective bargaining 
agreement, the College reviewed its position 
concerning certain full-time members who volunteered 
for and performed work at second jobs. The College 
will pay those individuals time and one half of their full­
time rate for work done in excess of forty hours in a 
week.
In February 2010, two unit members, Mary Anne Rebel and Barry Foster 
worked for a few hours at a College sponsored student orientation event. Rebel 
was paid overtime but Foster was not. The College then requested Rebel to 
repay the overtime.
Soon after, a series of communications were exchanged between
representatives of NIEU and the College regarding the Rebel overpayment issue.
On February TO, 2010, the College’s Assistant Director of Human Resources,
Deborah Richey, sent an e-mail to Luke Shea, NIEU’s president, stating:
We were told that the work done [by] Mary Ann [Rebel] 
and Barry [Foster] was not related in any way to mail 
room activities but that they were at a table at student 
orientation “checking students.” Since this was not 
their primary function at HVCC, and a rate had yet to 
be established, Sue Smith offered them the work at 
straight rate.
We do have specific rates for incidental functions like:
Retention Calling ($12)
Graduation Usher 
Exam Proctors ($15) ~
Some New Student Orientation functions
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All work outside the regular job description that is 
considered secondary and incidental is not paid at 
someone’s overtime rate, but rather at an established 
rate for that “function.” I don’t remember exact dates, 
but this was hashed out back in summer 2004 -  there 
might have been an MOA, but I don’t have them all.
Similarly, by letter to Rebel dated February 22, 2010, Payroll Supervisor Christine
Lasch, explained:
As discussed, you were overpaid on the February 12,
2010 payroll for the 2 hours you worked at the New 
Student Orientation. We paid you at your overtime 
rate and according [to] the payroll authorization, you 
should have been paid at your regular hourly rate for 
these hours. I know you were disputing this 
overpayment, but we received notification from the 
Office of Human Resources today that confirmed you 
were overpaid.
Shea testified that the parties then attempted to resolve the issue at Labor 
Management meetings, but were unsuccessful.
On March 2, 2010, NIEU’s attorney sent an e-mail to the College’s
attorney, asking that he look into the Rebel overtime issue. In response, the
College’s attorney forwarded an e-mail that he had received from the College’s
Director of Human Resources, John Tibbetts, in which Tibbetts stated:
The issue is one of incidental assistance with a college 
function. What happened was that Joel for the first time this 
year put aside some money to pay for assistance at new 
student orientation. Assistance in the past has been unpaid 
volunteer. Sue Smith asked if anyone wanted to help just to 
sit at a desk and give direction. Two NIEU members said 
yes although it was not unit work and was open to anyone 
who wished to help. Sue told them it was not OT and would 
be at their usual rate. This was truly volunteer and incidental 
-  no unit’s work, just help with a college function from 
anyone who wished to help.
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Payroll paid it at time and half without thinking and didn’t do 
what the payroll authorization stated. One member did not 
yet have the check so another was issued for straight rate.
One member got the check and is refusing to pay back the 
half overpay.
We never agreed to pay time and a half for anything a unit 
member did for the college and in fact have NIEU doing 
retention calling at a fixed rate regularly. I’ve told Sue we 
will need to establish a rate for future events for anyone who 
wishes to assist.
On May 12, 2010, Tibbetts issued a memorandum to the “Supervisors of 
Classified Staff’ regarding second jobs. The memorandum stated, in relevant 
part:
Because of the intransigence of NIEU leadership, the 
College can no longer hire current classified staff members 
for any secondary functions, no matter how brief or 
infrequent, as this results in a demand for “overtime” 
payment for any work beyond normal schedule. This 
prohibition includes ANY work beyond 37.5 hours per week 
or 40 hours per week depending on the employee’s regular 
schedule, even if in a totally different capacity from an 
employee’s primary function. We will no longer be able to 
offer additional earnings opportunities even where an 
employee is entirely satisfied with an established rate if it is 
less than time-and-a-half that employee’s regular rate. 
Regrettably, we will no longer be able to offer such earning 
opportunities even where both parties are entirely satisfied 
with the work performed.
The current average wage of an NIEU member is $16.44 per 
hour for an OT wage of $24.6733 per hour. It clearly makes 
little sense to have basic ancillary functions performed for 
such a rate. For grant functions where a benefit fraction 
must be included, the resultant hourly cost becomes absurd.
This prohibition does not, of course, apply to normal 
overtime situations in which an employee must spend extra 
hours to complete his or her own regular function.
We are left with a need to recruit and hire part-time 
assistance rather than utilize our current classified staff for
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many “extra” functions including part-time grant work, events 
and ad hoc or special initiatives. For grants in preparation, 
the appropriate contractual rate for the function should be 
included and an external search contemplated. An 
academic department secretary will no longer be able to 
earn time-and-a-half on a departmental grant for extra work 
and we will hire new part-time assistance instead. For 
special events, we will hire through FSA where possible. For 
special initiatives, we will recruit on a spot or pool basis and 
deploy as needed. The bill rate for a temporary agency 
staffer will almost always be considerably cheaper than the 
OT rate of a current staff member.
Unless overtime is a function of an employee’s primary 
duties ie (sic) an extension of his/her normal job in order to 
address a backlog or cover additional hours of operation, a 
recruitment effort will be necessary and full-time classified 
staff will not be eligible for the function. ,
The College does not find it necessary to pay exorbitant 
hourly rates or to defend its actions in administrative 
hearings in order to accomplish its mission, and will engage 
in whatever search efforts are warranted by staffing needs 
as they become apparent.
Shea testified that, as a result of Tibbetts’ directive, no unit employees 
have been offered or permitted to work any “second jobs.”
Tibbetts testified that second jobs are “any function performed by an 
employee...in addition to or in excess of their primary job obligation,” and that 
regularly scheduled second jobs are “routine functions,” as opposed to second 
jobs that are “sporadic or incidental.” He further testified that the agreement 
between NIEU and the. College regarding overtime for second jobs did not apply 
to occasional and sporadic second jobs, which continued to be paid at the 
applicable established rates.
Regarding the issue with Rebel and Foster, Tibbetts testified that the 
payroll department, in error, paid Rebel at an overtime rate and that Rebel was
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asked to return the excess. He further acknowledged that a series of Labor
Management meetings were held in an attempt to resolve the issue. Tibbetts
testified, in relevant part:
The eventual discussion was about the issue of 
payment of overtime for any hours beyond 37.5 for a 
unit member, in opposition to what we felt had been 
our practice and understanding up until that time.
...we would pay beyond 40, but we would pay the 
prevailing hourly rate between 37.5 and 40. Both 
sides appeared fairly entrenched in their 
understandings, and it became evident to me the 
posture of NIEU was going to be any work done by 
one of their members, whether it be regularly 
scheduled or occasional, even if it wasn’t unit work, 
we were going to be expected to pay time and a half 
their regular rate for those functions.
Tibbetts testified that the College was unwilling to adopt NIEU’s broad
interpretation of “second jobs.” According to Tibbetts, the College informed NIEU
that “it’s not something we are willing to do, and as long as this persists, we’re
simply going to eliminate the problem by not having those jobs available.”
Regarding his use of the word “intransigence” in his memorandum to the
supervisory staff, Tibbetts testified:
It was certainly my intent to respond to what I thought 
was a new practice being demanded by the 
bargaining unit. The reason we used the term 
“intransigence” is our supervisory staff has a habit of 
blaming Administration for causing them problems, 
and I wanted to make sure they knew it wasn’t our 
intransigence causing the issue.
Tibbetts stated that he costed out what NIEU was looking for, and that “it 
became evident that were we to implement increased earnings from 37.5 to 40 
and pay overtime for incidental functions, it would become prohibitively
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expensive.” Using the test proctoring as an example, Tibbetts stated that an 
NIEU member earning an hourly rate of $20 would cost the College more in 
overtime than a faculty member earning $29.61 per hour. However, on cross- 
examination, Tibbetts admitted that, if a faculty member’s rate of pay for 
proctoring an exam is higher than an NIEU member’s straight or overtime rate, the 
College would still use the faculty member per his memorandum directing that 
NIEU members no longer work second jobs.
Finally, Tibbetts testified that his decision to cease utilizing NIEU members 
for second jobs was implemented several months later, at the beginning of the 
following academic year, because the College did not want to “yank the rug out
l
from under people who were counting on the money.”
DISCUSSION
Underlying the parties’ dispute is their disagreement over the meaning of 
“second job” for which unit employees are entitled to overtime pay. Despite 
NIEU’s advocacy, the College applies a narrower meaning to the term than NIEU 
would have it. The merits of that disagreement must be resolved through 
collective negotiations or in the appropriate dispute resolution forum. We express 
no opinion regarding the merits of that dispute.
The question before us is not whether the College must pay overtime in 
any specific context, but whether the College ceased to offer unit employees any 
second jobs at all in retaliation for NIEU’s persistent assertion that they should be 
paid overtime for such work. The applicable test to determine such a violation is
well settled:
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When an improper practice charge alleges unlawfully 
motivated interference or discrimination in violation of 
§§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, a charging party has 
the burden of demonstrating three elements by a 
preponderance of evidence: a) the affected individual 
engaged in protected activity under the Act; b) such 
activity was known to the person or persons taking 
the employment action; and c) the employment action 
would not have been taken “but for” the protected 
activity.2
Contrary to the College’s argument to us, we find that NIEU’s advocacy in 
support of its position that the term “second job” for which employees are entitled 
to overtime should be more broadly read than the College would have it, is 
protected activity under the Act. The protected status of that advocacy is not 
diminished because the College disagrees with NIEU’s position or that NIEU’s 
position is incorrect. In this regard, we note that while the initial disagreement 
was over the payments to Rebel and Foster, it quickly became a disagreement 
that covered all employees in the bargaining unit.
As for the second element of proof necessary to establish a violation of §§ 
209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act -  that the person(s) responsible for the at-issue 
conduct knew of the protected activities -  the record fully establishes that 
Tibbetts, who was responsible for the decision to cease offering “second jobs” to 
unit employees, was well aware of NIEU’s advocacy on behalf of the unit that 
such employees were entitled to overtime pay for the work.
2 State of New York (State University of New York at Buffalo), 46 PERB 3021, at 
p. 3039-40 (2013). See. also, UFT, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (Jenkins), 41 PERB H 
3007 (2008)(subsequent history omitted); County of Wyoming, 34 PERB 3042 
(2001); Stockbridge Valley Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB 1J3007 (1993); County of 
Orleans, 25 PERB 1J3010 (1992); Town of Independence, 23 PERB 1J3020 (1990); 
City of Salamanca, 18 PERB TT3012 (1985).
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Regarding the third necessary element of proof -  “but for” the exercise of 
protected rights the at-issue conduct would not have occurred -  we agree with the 
College’s argument that the ALJ applied a less stringent standard; i.e., that the 
College’s decision not to offer second jobs to unit employees was “at least 
partially motivated by” NIEU’s advocacy on behalf of the unit. Indeed, we find that 
the record shows that the ALJ understated the nexus between Tibbetts’ decision 
and NIEU’s protected activities.
Tibbetts’ May 12, 2010 announcement unambiguously stated that his 
decision to cease offering “second jobs to unit employees was “because of the 
intransigence of NIEU leadership,” emphasizing that whenever such work is 
performed, it ‘‘results in a demand for ‘overtime’ payment for any work beyond 
normal schedule" [emphasis added]. After describing myriad costs and 
inconveniences to the College and lost earning opportunities for the unit 
employees, Tibbetts’ announcement explained that “[t]he College does not find it 
necessary to pay exorbitant hourly rates or to defend its actions in administrative 
hearings in order to accomplish its mission” [emphasis added].
The nexus between NIEU’s protected activity -  its advocacy on behalf of
the unit -  and Tibbetts’ decision not to offer second job opportunities to unit
employees is further supported by Tibbetts’ description of the labor management
meetings at which the overtime pay issue was discussed:
Both sides appeared fairly entrenched in their 
understandings, and it became evident to me the 
posture of NIEU was going to be any work done by 
one of their members, whether it be regularly 
scheduled or occasional, even if it wasn’t unit work,
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Accordingly, the record establishes that, “but for” NIEU’s advocating that 
unit employees be paid overtime for second jobs in excess of their regularly 
scheduled hours of work, Tibbetts would not have stopped offering them second 
jobs.
We reject the College’s argument that its decision was motivated by 
legitimate business reasons. The record shows that Tibbetts was motivated by 
NIEU’s advocacy -  not the College’s disputed duty to pay overtime. Put another 
way, we find that Tibbetts’ motivation was to avoid NIEU’s persistent efforts to 
obtain overtime pay for the second jobs. Indeed, as Tibbetts’ announcement 
reveals, the College is significantly inconvenienced by Tibbetts’ decision not to 
use unit employees for the work: His illustration of the fiscal savings the College 
could obtain by hiring a straight time faculty member to perform a second job at 
$30.00 per hour compared to assigning the work to a unit member whose straight 
time pay is $20.00 per hour yields virtually no savings to the College by not paying 
the unit employee overtime ($30.00 per hour). Moreover, accepting Tibbetts’ 
representation that “[t]he current average wage of an NIEU member is $16.44 per 
hour,” the average overtime pay for a second job would be less than $25.00 per 
hour, yielding a savings to the College of $5.00 per hour by assigning the work to 
a unit employee rather than a faculty member. In any event, Tibbetts testified that 
he would not assign the second job to a unit employee pursuant to his directive, 
even if such a savings could be obtained. Therefore, based on Tibbetts’ own 
assessment of the relative cost of using faculty to perform second jobs rather than
we were going to be expected to pay time and a half
their regular rate for those functions.
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using unit employees, the College obtains no fiscal savings by not offering the 
work to unit employees -  even at an overtime rate.
Finally, whether unit employees are entitled to overtime for work 
characterized as “incidental” or “secondary” in Richey’s February 10, 2010 letter 
to Shea is a matter about which we express no opinion. As we previously noted, 
the issue before us is not how much the College must pay unit employees to 
perform “second jobs” or what work constitutes “second jobs.” The issue here is 
whether the College’s decision not to assign any “second jobs” to unit employees 
was in retaliation for NIEU’s persistent efforts to obtain overtime pay for all such 
work, no matter how that work is defined. We find that it was.
Indeed, as Tibbetts anticipates, it is possible that if the College were to pay 
unit employees the scheduled pay for work described in Richey’s February 10, 
2008 letter, rather than overtime pay, NIEU might demand that the employees be 
paid overtime. While such a demand does not mean that the College has a duty 
to pay the overtime, the College may not retaliate against unit employees for 
NIEU’s advocacy on behalf of the unit. That advocacy is a protected activity, even 
if NIEU’s position is wrong. In effect, it is not the pay about which Tibbetts 
complains; it is NIEU’s anticipated demand for the overtime pay that triggered his 
decision not to offer or permit unit employees to work any second jobs, including 
sporadic and incidental jobs, irrespective of whether they are entitled to overtime 
pay for the work.
By reason of the foregoing, we find that the College violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) 
•and (c) of the Act by refusing to offer second jobs to employees represented by
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NIEU in retaliation for NIEU’s advocacy on behalf of unit employees that they be 
paid overtime for such work.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT Hudson Valley Community College 
and the County of Rensselaer will:
1. Immediately rescind the memorandum dated May 12, 2010 and allow full­
time NIEU unit members to continue to work second jobs at the College;
2. Restore full-time NIEU unit members to the second jobs they previously 
held;
3. Make those individuals whole for wages and benefits lost resulting from 
the May 12, 2010 memorandum, plus interest at the maximum legal rate; and
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
normally used to post notices of information to NIEU unit members.
DATED: April 3, 2014
Albany, New York
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
)
We hereby notify all employees of Hudson Valley Community College and 
the County of Rensselaer (College), in the unit represented by the Hudson 
Valley Community College Non-lnstructional Employees Union (NIEU), that 
the College will:
1. Immediately rescind the memorandum dated May 12, 2010 and allow full­
time NIEU unit members to continue to work second jobs at the College;
2. Restore full-time NIEU unit members to the second jobs they previously 
held; and
3. Make those individuals whole for wages and benefits lost resulting from the 
May 12, 2010 memorandum, plus interest at the maximum legal rate.
Dated ................... B y .....................................................................
on behalf of Hudson Valley Community College 
and County of Rensselaer
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, 
~ ind must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
